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1. Introduction 
 The modern world is characterized by the development of numerous overlapping and 
interconnected regional integration agreements (RIA) and international unions. Usually the 
international economic activity of a particular country is influenced by the interplay of the 
spaghetti bowl of numerous international institutions and regimes. A particular example of 
this interaction is the development of the Eastern European countries of the former Soviet 
Union (FSU) – Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. On the one hand, these countries participate 
(more or less willingly) in numerous integration attempts and initiatives developed in the 
post-Soviet space, from the original Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to a number 
of subregional integration groups. On the other hand, Eastern Europe – as the whole European 
continent and surrounding countries – is under heavy impact of the probably most successful 
and in any case unique international institution –European Union (EU). 
 The interaction of these two institutional systems (with different strategies for the 
Eastern European region) seems to have a significant impact not only on external economic 
policies, but also on the general process of economic development and institutional 
transformation of the CIS countries. Nevertheless, it would be too simplified to reduce the 
impact on both post-Soviet and European integration to the “intended” action. An even more 
important aspect is related to the “unintended” results of their interaction, as well as the very 
existence of the integration projects. This paper aims to analyze this sophisticated system of 
interrelations and competition. 
 The paper is organized as follows. The second section presents the current level of 
development of the post-Soviet integration and the European integration with respect to the 
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Eastern European countries, as well as strategies implemented. The third section summarizes 
the mutual interaction effects on both policy and existence level. Finally, the last section deals 
with institutional alternatives from both purely normative point of view and their 
implementation opportunities for the post-Soviet region. 
 
2. Post-Soviet and European integration in the Eastern Europe so far 
2.1. Post-Soviet integration 
 The current account of the post-Soviet integration seems to be dismal. Indeed, the 
Eastern European region encompasses a variety of integration projects. The oldest initiative, 
the CIS, includes all countries of the region, while the latter and more concentrated Eurasian 
Economic Community (EurAzEC) comprises only Belarus (alongside with Russia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan). Belarus and Russia form a specific 
Union State, which theoretically aims to go beyond the simple international integration 
towards a more or less developed confederation. Finally, the Common Economic Space 
(CES) including Belarus and Ukraine (as well as Russia and Kazakhstan) was based on the 
idea to move from institutional integration to a functional model, based on the consequent 
implementation of the “four freedoms” principle; however, due to the position of Ukraine the 
CES remained at the stage of negotiations and is currently often replaced by the idea of a 
close union of the group of most developed countries of the EurAzEC – Russia, Belarus and 
Kazakhstan (the so-called EurAzEC-3 project). The absolute majority of the post-Soviet 
integration projects are formed by Russian-centric structures with similar functions, 
underlying ideas and strategies, but different membership. 
 The wide network of integration projects established a huge institutional 
infrastructure. For example, in autumn 2005 the CIS included eight “statutory bodies” 
established according to the CIS treaty, 67 sectoral bodies (ranging from disaster prevention 
to libraries exchange) and nine affiliated public and private institutions like Inter-State Bank, 
Agricultural Union, Leasing Confederation etc.). Most of the supranational institutions 
duplicate themselves in all integration structures. The total number of agreements exceeds 
2,500. Different unions experimented with different voting rules and formal arrangements. 
However, one should clearly state, that all integration agreements have one particular 
common feature: they all failed! Even the most ambitious projects did not exceed the level of 
an FTA From the economic point of view, despite formal agreements (and partly in line with 
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them, if they contradict each other) member countries introduce new (often unilateral) 
restrictions on trade, investments and migration. The trade wars (e.g. for pipes, meat or sugar 
between Russia and Ukraine or wine between Russia, Moldova and Georgia) have an 
important influence on trade relations. Even Belarus, which claims to achieve the highest 
success in the integration process, still imposes severe restrictions on Russian exports: for 
example, government sets a mandatory share of goods of Belarus origin to be offered in retail 
stores, thus discriminating against Russian producers. A typical situation in the CIS and other 
subregional groups is that the majority of treaties are not implemented in national legislation; 
a survey of the CIS Executive Committee in 1997 found out, that only 130 of 880 agreements 
really came into force. The gap between formal law and behaviour of authorities in the post-
Soviet countries even deepens the problem. 
 The positions of post-Soviet countries of the Eastern European region with respect to 
the post-Soviet integration differ substantially. A very simplified approach could be based on 
distinction between two groups of countries. Ukraine and Moldova form the first group. Both 
countries are extremely reluctant to actively participate in the post-Soviet integration 
processes; in fact, this skepticism remains a constant feature of their international activity for 
the last decade. Indeed, both states had a short period of “romantic relations” to the post-
Soviet projects: for Ukraine it was the late Leonid Kuchma period, when the idea of the CES 
was actively used in internal political conflicts; for Moldova the very early period of the 
government of Vladimir Voronin was based on the idea of close cooperation with Russia (and 
even Moldova’s membership in the Union State); however, in both cases the political process 
does not seem to be sustainable. The critical attitude towards the post-Soviet projects is a 
common feature of a wide political spectrum in both countries: the differences are rather 
whether the post-Soviet project should be rejected completely or it is reasonable to develop a 
limited and specifically designed integration system. For Ukraine, for example, the main goal 
from the point of view of the post-Soviet integration has always been a consequent FTA 
within the CIS or CES framework, which does not include any goals of further institutional 
integration and establishment of supranational institutions. There are political forces 
supporting stronger integration, but their impact on decision-making is negligible. 
 On the other hand, the countries of this group are strongly dependent from Russia and 
the CIS in terms of their economic relations. The first and the most obvious reason is the 
energy factor. Ukraine receives most of its energy resources from Russia and (through the 
Russian territory) from Turkmenistan. The same is true for Moldova; moreover, the largest 
power plant in the country located in Transdniestrian region is controlled by the Russian 
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Unified Energy Systems Stock Company (RAO EES). For both countries the CIS is an 
important trade partner; however, while Ukrainian ferrous metallurgy is much more 
competitive on international markets, Moldova is primarily an agricultural state: the reality of 
the EU agricultural policy and the existing market situation makes the post-Soviet space the 
unique market for Moldovan exports. A good example is the wine export from Moldova to 
Russia, which seems to belong to crucial issues of the development of the Moldovan 
economy. Russia’s restrictions on the export of Moldovan wine seem to have a severe 
negative impact on the development of the country (see Grigoriev, Salikhov, 2006, p. 101).  
Both countries play an important role in terms of Russian FDI. Since 2000 Russian 
corporations actively explore the post-Soviet space establishing their investment presence in 
the majority of former Soviet republics. Ukraine is the main aim of Russian investments: in 
several industries like oil refinery they even have the dominant position on the national 
market. On the other hand, in Moldova Russian corporations seem to control the largest 
industrial enterprises, especially in Transdniestria (the data are, however, quite difficult to 
interpret). Last but not least the migration issues should be mentioned. They are especially 
important for Moldova, which is currently the second country in the world in terms of 
remittances from migrants (data of the Global Economic Prospects 2006 study). In fact, the 
situation is complicated: Moldovan citizens work both in Europe and in the CIS (mostly in 
Russia, but also in Ukraine). The specific status of Moldova allows them to receive the double 
Romanian citizenship; in the same way many people of Transdniestria (where Moldovan, 
Russian and Ukrainian groups form about 30% of the population each) possess Russian 
passports. According to the data available to us, the Russian direction is by far more 
important, than the European (at least, now): about 62% of labor migrants from Moldova 
work in Russia, and Ukraine is also an important target (CBS-AXA, 2005, p. 15). However, 
this indicator can change (if one takes issues like language characteristics of Moldova, the 
only CIS country with a language of the Romanian group and other issues into account) and 
be biased because of shadow migration (Sleptova, 2003). In fact, one cannot deny that 
Moldova is a very specific country, which is hardly able to fit any pre-designed concept. 
Another group is formed by Belarus. Belarus is a very active supporter of the post-
Soviet integration and even of the re-unification of the countries of the region. However, this 
position seems to be to a large extend caused by the internal political situation. The 
legitimization instruments used by the current leadership of Belarus define this country as a 
kind of “better Russia” – “Russia” free of drawbacks of transition and preserving the best 
from the past. In this case the support of the re-unification becomes necessary element of the 
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strategy of political survival. Cheap Russian gas also created an additional incentive for this 
kind of behavior. Yet the same factor – the need to support the perception of Belarus as the 
“better Russia” and to prevent its “corruption” makes the active support of real integration 
beyond rhetoric impossible. Belarus has been one of the most closed economies in the post-
Soviet world from the point of view of the opportunities for Russian FDI and Russian 
business in general. After the administration of Putin turned to a more pragmatic and 
economically motivated policy with respect to the post-Soviet space, the previous system of 
integration rhetoric became impossible. The relations between Russia and Belarus are 
currently influenced by permanent conflicts. However, Belarus is still supports integration: in 
fact, it became an alternative center of the regional integration concepts in the post-Soviet 
space competing with the projects of Russia and of Kazakhstan. Belarus, Ukraine and 
Moldova have been subject to intensive energy conflicts with Russia in the last years; this 
factor obviously has a negative impact on the integration initiatives. 
 
2.2. European integration 
 Unlike the post-Soviet integration, which already includes the countries of the region 
as its “co-owners” and members (although the primarily role belongs to Russia), for the EU 
the membership perspective is currently neither offered by the European Union nor set as an 
explicit goal for any of countries. However, the EU still has two important instruments to 
influence the situation in the region and to establish its own integration project. One is the 
traditional system of Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA); the second is the 
recently established European Neighborhood Policy. The official goal of the ENP project is to 
provide an instrument of “Everything but Institutions” integration for the countries at the 
borders of the EU: the integration should give them the opportunity to gain access to the 
European market and to participate in the European cooperation projects, but does not 
propose any membership perspective (see Chilosi, 2007, for a critical overview). 
 The same two groups of the Eastern European countries, as in case of the post-Soviet 
integration, can be considered for the European integration perspective. Moldova and Ukraine 
are actively involved in both ENP and PCA systems. PCA with Ukraine was signed in 1994 
and came into force in 1998. The EU-Ukraine Action Plan for the ENP was agreed upon in 
2005. The Ukrainian government includes a vast institutional structure for the European 
integration issues, which e.g. does not exist in Belarus (Verpoest, 2007). The idea of a more 
active integration with the EU (in different forms, but in final account aiming the 
membership) is supported by all major political forces. Moldova also takes part in ENP and 
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PCA (in force since 1998); both government and opposition support the European integration 
vector. Given the financial and organization resources of the EU, the cooperation seems to be 
quite fruitful in many issues.  
 The situation with Belarus is different. The institutional framework does not exist; 
PCA was not ratified and participation in the ENP is on hold. The government of Alexander 
Lukashenko faces the sanctions of the EU. The Belorussian policy towards the EU is mixed: 
on the one hand, the declarations of the country is often critical or even hostile towards the 
European Union,  but on the other hand, there are repeated (although unsystematic) attempts 
of reconciliation, which are also used as a bargaining instrument against Russia. 
 To conclude, the results of the European and post-Soviet projects for Eastern Europe 
differ substantially. The post-Soviet project with magniloquent goals still remains ink on 
paper integration; the support of the countries of the region for a more pragmatic and realistic 
approach is limited. On the other hand, the European presence in the region was much more 
pragmatic and much less ambitious; however, the outlook is more optimisitic and the project 
receives larger support. 
 
3. Post-Soviet integration and the EU 
As we have shown in the previous section, the Eastern European countries seem to 
become an area of indirect competition between two integration projects: the “large EU” 
including ENP and the post-Soviet integration. This is both a competition on the policy level 
and on the conceptual level when different designs for regional integration are discussed. 
Hence, it becomes important to understand the economic and political consequences of this 
competition for the functioning of both integration projects and, more importantly, for the 
economic transformation in the region. 
To start with, it would be wrong to claim that any competition between integration 
projects is per se a negative process. In fact, one can consider the competition of integration 
projects as described above a specific form of institutional competition, which is mostly 
associated for rivalry between individual governments for mobile labour and capital. The 
competition of integration projects is for sure a very specific form of institutional competition, 
which, however, also includes both “classical” mechanisms of institutional competition: voice 
and exit. Economics has developed a substantial literature on advantages of institutional 
competition as an instrument of organization of economic relations (see Vaubel, 2007, for a 
comprehensive survey). Many of these issues can be used to characterize the institutional 
competition between integration projects: 
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• First, the institutional competition facilitates the policy innovations and mutual learning 
between partners. While imitating the advantages of the alternative integration group, 
seeking for previously unexplored policy opportunities to sustain competition pressure or 
concentrating on specific institutional advantages, which, however (like the competitive 
advantages of a firm) can be discovered only in turn of the institutional competition. 
• Second, the Tiebout sorting argument can also be present in the discussion of institutional 
competition among alliances. The original Tiebout logic assumes that individuals in tern 
of institutional competition “sort” themselves according to their (heterogenous) 
preferences and develop homogenous groups, which thus are able to sustain higher quality 
economic institutions. It is also reasonable to assume, that international unions and 
alliances are formed among homogenous partners. However, the only way to find out the 
preference homogeneity (and, following the evolutionary economic policy approach, even 
to develop the preferences, which are originally unknown to policy-makers (Witt, 2003), 
is to engage in the institutional competition. 
• Third, institutional competition can function as a restriction to over-centralization. Alesina 
et al. (2005), among other prominent scholars, demonstrate that the real-world 
international unions are quite likely to centralize the areas where, according to the 
subsidiarity principle, the non-centralized solution through individual countries would 
function better. If institutional competition and therefore choice between different unions 
is present, countries can successfully mitigate this problem. 
The arguments presented above are of general nature. However, it is straightforward to 
argue, that the post-Soviet space could be characterized by a specific constellation of 
institutions (both formal and informal) causing a different outcome. In our previous work 
(Libman, 2007a) we have claimed that the institutional competition on the country level in the 
post-Soviet space does not completely follow the described “optimistic view”. Hence, it is 
probable that also in other fields the situation is different, and one has to examine the relations 
between two integration projects more closely. 
The first aspect is the policy level of the problem, i.e. the (intended and unintended) 
outcomes of the policy decisions of both integration groups. The most prominent problem 
influencing the post-Soviet and the European integration projects with this respect is what one 
may call a “security dilemma”. There are two forms of security dilemmas (Collins, 2004). 
The system-induced security dilemma is based on systematic misperception of the goals of the 
counterpart: any attempts of the counterpart to improve its economic position or achieve 
humanitarian goals are mistakenly considered an attempt to attack or to cause any harm to the 
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international actor and therefore results into inadequate reaction. The state-induced security 
dilemma goes even deeper: in this case not just a certain activity of the counterpart, but any 
measure improving the position of the counterpart is perceived as a threat: so, the counterpart 
is considered an unambiguous enemy, and the only solution to the security problem the 
reduction of its potential to an absolute minimum.  
The misperceptions in the relations between Russia and the Western countries are 
broad, and the post-Soviet integration / ENP is just a particular example of the problem. Yet 
the integration attempts are connected with different problems for the partners. Russia 
misinterprets the Western attention to internal policy in post-Soviet countries as an 
exclusively interest-lead realpolitik (Piel, Schulze & Timmermann 2005), although 
humanitarian or idealistic reasons may cause it, since those play an important role for the EU 
foreign policy. On the other hand, many Western observers reduce the post-Soviet integration 
to a new instrument of “Russian imperialism” (Link 2001), thus ignoring its economic 
component. The problem is, that realpolitik component is of course indeed present in the 
policies of the EU (the readmission debate or the energy issues are just one example), and 
hegemonic component is also part of Russia’s political activity in the CIS. Both partners are 
guided (as it is always the case in the real-world politics) by a combination of different goals, 
which are often hided beyond each other: so, the misperception is inevitable.  
Unfortunately, in a low-trust environment it is likely to cause social dilemma 
situations with inefficient outcomes. The problem is, moreover, that at least in Russia we 
observe a clear shift from system-induced to the state-induced dilemma: a very good example 
was the reaction of a large part of Russian media and expert community on the failure of the 
EU constitution. In fact, several observers seemed to consider the results of the referenda in 
France and in the Netherlands a “lucky event” for Russia, since in this case the EU would 
remain too weak to become an active player in the CIS region. 
However, as already mentioned, the results (both intended and unintended) of the EU 
and CIS/Russian policy is only one aspect of institutional development. As Caiser (2007) puts 
it, “the EU … impacts on its neighbouring countries more from what it is than from what it 
does”. So, it is reasonable to discuss the impact of the EU on the post-Soviet integration, 
which result from the internal development of the European Union and its very specific 
position in the international community (as a union theoretically open for all European 
countries). From this point of view, the very existence of the European Union as an attractive 
international institution establishes at least three further “traps” with significant negative 
impact on the development of the post-Soviet institutions.  
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The first trap can be referred to as a “trap of integration illusions”.  It develops when 
countries expecting the EU accession are not ready to enter any post-Soviet integration 
projects, even if the European integration is less realistic in the short and medium term and 
there are possible gains from deeper cooperation with the neighbours. In fact, it implies, that 
the EU neighbouring countries both overestimate their accession probability (or underestimate 
the duration of the accession negotiations period) and consider the alternative integration 
projects a threat for the EU membership. The first fact results from extremely vague policies 
and policy-making in the EU, which is able to create enough hope on the one hand and to 
delay any real process indefinitely on the other hand. The second fact is an expectable result 
of the model of “fortress Europe” implemented in the European Union since its very 
beginning and typical for the old regionalism approach. 
The second trap, the “trap of integration disillusions” appears, when the failing 
disciplinarian pressure of the European perspectives allows the incumbents to block the 
necessary reforms, thus preventing not only European, but also post-Soviet integration. It is 
well known that perspectives of the EU accession can act as an efficient instrument for 
disciplining national governments in order to promote necessary economic reforms and 
restrict rent seeking. The guiding principles for the reforms are the Copenhagen criteria and 
the acquis communautaire (common law) of the EU, which, in spite of all its problems and 
contradictions, still incorporates a significantly superior institutional authority to that of most 
EU neighbouring countries. This effect can obviously go down in two cases. On the one hand, 
if the accession is certain (e.g. because of political reasons), the countries do not really need to 
implement reforms necessary, since the evaluation of their progress is biased anyway. This 
problem, however, does not seem to have an impact on the post-Soviet countries. A more 
important case is when there is no clear relation between the results (or the effort) of reforms 
and the perspectives of accession; at least, the elites of the EU neighbouring countries do not 
perceive this relation as straightforward. In this case the costs of strengthening up are 
perceived to be higher than potential benefits. The problem is not only that the institutional 
development per se becomes less successful, but also that the probability of development of 
alternative (to the EU) integration projects, which heavily depends upon the institutional and 
governance quality in the member countries (see Libman, 2007). Paradoxically both traps 
influence political decisions of the CIS countries simultaneously. The most prominent 
example is probably Kuchma’s Ukraine. On the one hand, the country officially declared its 
aim to develop close integration with the European Union and remained a relatively reluctant 
member of the CIS (in fact, the perspective towards post-Soviet integration changed only after 
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the Common Economic Space was established and mostly because of internal political 
struggles. 
The third trap may be related to the problem of institutional isomorphism (Powell & 
DiMaggio 1983) between the EU and the post-Soviet space. In fact, most of the post-Soviet 
integration projects to a certain extend attempt to imitate the European integration (in fact, it 
is true for the majority of non-European integration initiatives). However, despite the strong 
isomorphism of the post-Soviet integration projects with the institutions of European 
integration, it is not clear, whether the European experience of regionalism is exactly the most 
appropriate one for the specific case of integration in the CIS space. The open regionalism, 
the competitive regionalism, or even the “simple” functional integration focusing on selected 
economic projects may be more interesting for this region. Once again, since the crisis of the 
old regionalism (and the early integration studies) it is straightforward that the European 
project was a unique integration institution, which could not be simply transplanted to other 
regions. In fact, one can see parallels with the “European miracle” discussion: while a unique 
constellation of economic, social and political factors (and, probably, pure luck) the European 
countries managed to achieve unique success and create the modern world-economy (Jones, 
2003). So, probably the European integration of the 20s century is as unique as the European 
miracle of the 15s century. There are certainly lessons to be learned from the EU experience, 
yet the degree of imitation should be limited. The CES was the first less ambitious project in 
the region that included several elements of open regionalism, however, since Russia, Belarus 
and Kazakhstan have decided to insist on the “package approach”, i.e. adoption of all 
agreements of the CES establishing a custom union, it is doubtful, whether the CES is going 
to hold these principles in the future. 
So far our analysis assumed that the economic and institutional effects of both 
structures (EU/ENP and the post-Soviet integration) are more or less identical. This 
assumption is definitively not completely true. The integration process is important not only 
from the point of view of international economic relations, but because of its impact on the 
internal institutional progress and reforms. So far post-Soviet countries face a systematic 
problem of the relatively low quality of institutions, mostly resulting to three main negative 
consequences: deficit of trust in society and economy, deficit of law (because of both poor 
legal design and poor enforcement) and abundance of economic power. The institutional 
system of the EU, although also definitively subject to disadvantages, is definitively superior 
to that of the post-Soviet economies.  
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As mentioned above, EU can act as an actor supporting positive institutional changes. 
Kyvelidis (2000) considers the problem of “state isomorphism”, which shows, that countries 
in relative proximity to the EU seem to demonstrate higher advancements in institutional 
development. Obydenkova (2007) in her empirical study comes to the conclusion that 
communication with the EU is more important, than geography. Unfortunately, for the 
Eastern European countries (unlike several other post-Soviet republics) one can hardly expect 
a positive impact from the post-Soviet integration from the point of view of the quality of 
governance and institutions. So, what one observes is a kind of “asymmetric” economic and 
political effects. The “illusion” of the post-Soviet alternative can therefore also limit the 
disciplining effect of the EU and the improvement of the quality of institutions. As Grinberg 
(2005) puts it, the post-Soviet elites are willing to follow the Russian “rules of the games” 
(i.e. semi-authoritarian institutions), but are reluctant to support integration with Russia; vice 
versa, they are willing to support the EU integration, but reluctant (or unable) to live under the 
European rules of transparency.  
Under these conditions the deepening of economic and political relations with the EU 
beyond the joint declarations could become questionable. But, since low quality of institutions 
at the same time plays an important role in the disaster of the post-Soviet integration, this 
situation also undermines the post-Soviet integration. So, the post-Soviet integration is a kind 
of “self-undermining” institution in terms of Greif and Latin (2004): its persistence limits 
reforms and therefore also limits the set of parameters under which integration is self-
enforcing. Moreover, this particular situation supports the inefficient ink-on-paper integration, 
as it exists in the post-Soviet world. 
Finally, the basic assumption of the institutional competition theory was that the 
competition between integration projects is likely to improve the quality of institutions 
through the learning process. Unfortunately, the opposite development, namely the mutual 
learning leading to spreading inefficient institutions is also possible. In this case exactly the 
most developed countries import institutions and rules of behaviour from their less developed 
counterparts (e.g. in the field of corruption). Oleinik (2007) calls this alternative the “negative 
convergence” hypothesis and demonstrates it considering the example of Russia and Europe. 
It is yet to be seen whether negative convergence is empirically founded and therefore indeed 
represents a threat for economic development; however, the problem should be seriously 
considered. 
To conclude, although the institutional competition could generally be beneficial for 
the international union, there are many problems in the post-Soviet space reducing this effect. 
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Therefore, the outcomes of competition could become dismal. However, one should not 
overestimate this result: the very nature of competition makes its outcome even theoretically 
hardly predictable (since the necessary knowledge can be acquired only in turn of the 
competition process).  
  
4. Outlook 
 The pessimistic conclusions of the previous section make it necessary to discuss, 
whether more efficient alternatives exist and can be implemented. The problem is actually, 
whether it is possible to re-design the post-Soviet integration so that it moves from current 
inefficient model to a situation promoting institutional quality. In fact, if one looks at the 
problem from this point of view, the post-Soviet project could even benefit from the European 
project. In what follows we list a number of different directions of transformation, which 
could improve the interaction between the European Union and the post-Soviet integration 
processes in the Eastern European region. Note, that we do not consider the implementation 
problems: our aim is to provide a purely normative analysis. 
If the institutional competition is criticised, an alternative always present and probably 
attractive could be the support of co-operation of both institutions. It can become especially 
important in the security issues, like the resolution of frozen conflicts in Transdniestria and in 
Caucasus. However, it does not solve the problem of impacts on institutional quality.  
Although currently both the post-Soviet and the European integration concentrate on 
identical goals, it is possible to consider a “division of labour” between these two institutions. 
For the post-Soviet integration an alternative could be the Commonwealth model (following 
the example of the (British) Commonwealth, which, by the way, also constituted a competitor 
to the European integration for the United Kingdom for a certain period of time). The 
common perception of the Commonwealth is that of an extremely weak and ineffective 
institution based mostly on traditions. In our opinion, this point of view overestimates the 
disadvantages of the Commonwealth and ignores its benefits. In fact, many aspects of the 
activity of the Commonwealth in humanitarian and social issues, as well as the permanent 
interaction of private and public actors as parts of its structure can have quite important 
positive impact on the member countries. For example, the cooperation in the education 
sphere (e.g. the association of the universities of the Commonwealth) is an important factor 
promoting the social integration across countries. 
If one still does not accept the Commonwealth model, it is reasonable to consider an 
alternative regional integration model for the post-Soviet space. As already mentioned, an 
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attractive alternative coming from APEC, is the open regionalism: a system where countries 
are free to enter any integration agreements outside the structure and decide on the degree and 
direction of economic opening up through individual and collective action plans. The open 
regionalism model does not function well if the number of participants is too high, and 
therefore the heterogeneity increases enormously. But for a smaller group of countries this 
approach (by the way, explicitly supporting the institutional competition and avoiding 
negative effects like security dilemma) could be very helpful for the development of the 
regional cooperation. It also explicitly encompasses the variety of integration patterns (also 
due to different status in international economic relations, e.g. with the EU) preferred by 
individual countries. Yet the open regionalism alternative, though very attractive, requires 
also re-design of the European policy (in particular, ENP) towards the CIS region. 
Another integration design to be considered is the direct link between the European 
and the post-Soviet integration. In this case the post-Soviet integration should be co-ordinated 
with the European policies of the member states. In fact, ENP explicitly supports the 
cooperation among participants; moreover, the experience of enlargement gives rise to 
another attractive example of the Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA), directly 
supported as enforced by the EU as an intermediary step in the economic integration and 
economic reforms of the countries of the Central and Eastern Europe. The presence of the 
European Union as an “external” and “active” partner in the program could be helpful to 
mitigate the permanent obstacles for the post-Soviet integration: deficit of trust between post-
Soviet countries and problems of overwhelming weight of the Russian Federation. However, 
this approach also requires the co-ordination between the ENP and the system of four 
common spaces, connecting Russia with the EU.  
Moreover, an important issue where the post-Soviet integration could be effective is 
the establishment of transcontinental linkages in the Eurasian space. Linn and Tiomkin (2006) 
empathize the importance of the development of economic and political ties across the 
Eurasian continent, focusing on four areas: energy trade, transport infrastructure, 
communications/knowledge and capital movements. So far the institutional infrastructure of 
the Eurasian integration project has been limited and includes a variety of overlapping 
institutions. One can claim that the post-Soviet integration (properly designed) could become 
a helpful instrument to facilitate the implementation of projects in the Eurasian space. It 
definitively means the decision in favour of a less ambitious integration system with clear 
focus on individual projects, but in the long run the positive effects even of this limited 
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integration approaches could be helpful. A necessary precondition is also the interaction with 
other regional projects, like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. 
Finally, one should not forget, that even the most modest form of integration as a 
“permanent forum” for the meetings and discussions at the top level is important. There are 
only few regions of the world where institutions establish regular meetings and 
communication among leaders. In the post-Soviet space this institutional environment is 
present: one should definitively not underestimate it.  
The variety of institutional alternatives able to establish the framework of efficient 
interaction between post-Soviet and European integration naturally raises the problem of 
implementation. Unfortunately, significant transformation of any international organization is 
a very costly and time-consuming process. The organizational inertia and path dependency 
can be overcome only with huge effort. Yet in the post-Soviet space the existence of the 
security dilemma between Russia and the West / EU is also a crucial factor with negative 
influence on the probability of transformation. In fact, the dilemma (because of reasons 
beyond the issues of the post-Soviet integration) increased a lot in the last two years. 
Therefore the question of political feasibility of transformation remains open. 
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